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1 Introduction
There are many real-world settings where several players interact in a non-cooperative
game with binary decisions, such as electricity markets (on-off decision for a power
plant), transportation and facility location models (Caunhye et al., 2012), engineer-
ing (Rao, 1996), as well as agriculture and land-use planning (To´th et al., 2011).
Modelling Nash equilibria between players which face both binary and continuous
decisions is a challenging problem (Scarf, 1990). Economists and game theorists usu-
ally apply brute-force methods by exploring all possible combinations and check every
solution for deviation incentives of each player. When market-clearing prices to sup-
port a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the Walrasian sense do not exist, economists
suggest to use multi-part pricing (Hotelling, 1938) or deviate from marginal-cost pric-
ing to a “second-best” market outcome, such that no player should lose money from
participating (Baumol and Bradford, 1970). However, a canonical approach to find
pure-strategy Nash equilibria in binary games does not exist.
In many large-scale practical applications, exploring the entire solution space is
not realistically possible. A common approach in such cases is to linearize the bi-
nary decisions; the Nash equilibrium can then be computed by solving the system of
first-order optimality conditions, a.k.a. equilibrium modeling using mixed complemen-
tarity problems or variational inequalities, if certain assumptions on convexity of the
linearized problem hold. Recent work seeks a trade-off between relaxation of the com-
plementarity (slackness) conditions or the integrality of discrete constraints to obtain
stationary points that are presumed to be equilibria of the original problem (Gabriel
et al., 2012, 2013; Fuller and C¸elebi, 2017).
In this work, we focus on applications where a relaxation of optimality conditions
or continuous relaxation of the binary decision variable (“linearization”) is either not
practical or yields incorrect results. Instead, we derive first-order optimality conditions
of the continuous variables for both states of each binary variable and include those
in an overall equilibrium problem simultaneously. Our method then selects the state
of the binary variable and corresponding continuous variable which provides the best
response for each individual player.
Due to the nature of a binary game, there are many instances where no set of
strategies and no price vector exists that supports a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies; i.e., there is no outcome where the pay-offs to each stakeholder are such that
no player has a profitable deviation. This is due to the non-convexity introduced by
the binary decision variables and indivisibilities (O’Neill et al., 2005). We introduce
the notion of a “quasi-equilibrium” to describe situations where no equilibrium exists,
but where a market operator or regulator can assign compensation payments in order
to obtain an incentive-compatible outcome. These payments align the incentives of
individual players with the objectives of the overall system, such as cost minimization
or welfare maximization. A regulator may also choose to intervene when an equilib-
rium exists but its outcome is inferior to the solution that a benevolent planner might
achieve. That is, the market operator may seek to minimize the deviation from the
system optimum (i.e., all decisions by one planner) caused by the non-cooperative
game among a number of decision makers, each seeking to optimize competing objec-
tives. Our solution approach allows to endogenously consider the trade-off between
regulatory intervention to improve market efficiency, and the distortions caused by
these interventions.
Electricity markets are the real-world application of binary games which have
received the most attention in the mathematical optimization literature (O’Neill et al.,
2013; Liu and Hobbs, 2013; Wogrin et al., 2013; Liu and Ferris, 2013; Philpott et al.,
2013; Bjørndal and Jo¨rnsten, 2008; Hu and Ralph, 2007; Philpott and Schultz, 2006;
O’Neill et al., 2005). A challenging problem arises from the on-off decision of power
plants, which usually incur substantial start-up or shut-down costs and, if operational,
2
face minimum-generation constraints. Because power markets are usually based on
marginal-cost, short-term pricing, the commitment costs (i.e., start-up costs) are not
necessarily covered by resulting market prices.
As a consequence, many electricity systems have rules that generators must be
“made whole” or have to be “in the money”; i.e., they receive “uplift payments” to
make sure that they do not lose money from participating in the market. This is
commonly referred to as a “no-loss rule”. However, this may not be required from a
game-theoretic point of view, and thereby lead to higher-than-necessary compensation
payments. At the same time, there might exist regulations that only power plants
that are actually generating electricity can receive compensation – the rationale being
that it may create perverse incentives for market participants to be paid to not do
something. We will discuss and illustrate in a numerical example how such market
rules can actually overly restrict operational efficiency and thereby reduce welfare.
The outline of this paper is as follows: in the next section, we summarize current
approaches to solve binary Nash games and place our contribution in the context of
methods applied to solve such problems in the power sector. In Section 3, we propose
an exact solution method to solve binary equilibrium problems. The obtained multi-
objective program explicitly incorporates the trade-off between overall efficiency and
compensation payments in cases where no equilibrium exists. Section 4 applies our
method to a power market example from the literature to illustrate its advantages and
flexibility to incorporate distinct market rules regarding uplift payments. Section 5
concludes with a discussion on methods, other possible applications, and future work.1
2 Current approaches to solve binary games
In this section, we motivate our method by describing how current solution methods
for binary games obtain equilibria, and we identify where our formulation can improve
this process. While there exist brute-force methods (Avis et al., 2010; Audet et al.,
2006; Von Stengel, 2002) that solve for an equilibrium considering all possible com-
binations of the binary variables and check ex-post for deviation incentives, we want
to concentrate on mathematical programming techniques for obtaining equilibria. For
large-scale applications such as those considered in this work, computational efficiency
proves a hurdle in these brute-force methods. Solving a large number of equilibrium
problems is not very elegant and suffers from a curse of dimensionality, because the
number of equilibrium problems to be solved is 2k, where k is the number of binary
variables. Therefore, mathematicians and Operations Researchers are constantly look-
ing for ways to apply advances in Variational Inequalities and Integer Programming
to develop faster methods to solve such problems.
2.1 Optimization and equilibrium modeling
Game theory and equilibrium problems have been an integral part of the history
of mathematical programming. First-order optimality (Karush-Kuhn-Tucker, KKT)
conditions, derived from each individual player’s optimization problem, can be solved
simultaneously by stacking them to form an equilibrium problem. Interpretations from
dual variables to constraints in a game theory analysis provide essential information
in equilibrium problems and are often interpreted as prices or marginal benefits for
1The Appendix provides computational results for a numerical test case using a larger data
set than the stylized example in Section 4. The GAMS codes for the stylized example, the
numerical test case, as well as an additional example for a resource market application with
multiple binary investment decisions in production and pipeline capacity for several player are
available for download at https://github.com/danielhuppmann/binary_equilibrium under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
3
individual players (Facchinei and Pang, 2003; Ferris and Pang, 1997; Murphy et al.,
1982).
However, this relationship between optimality conditions and equilibrium problems
fails once a game includes binary decision variables. The reason is that optimality
conditions cannot be directly derived for binary optimization problems. Thus, applied
researchers aim to solve such optimization problems in other ways. A method based
on a trade-off between relaxing the integrality and the complementarity constraints is
developed by Gabriel et al. (2013). While relaxing integrality has been employed as a
way to solve integer programs, relaxing complementarity – essentially the optimality
conditions – was the novel idea of their contribution.
A similar problem is tackled by Fuller and C¸elebi (2017); they propose a minimum
disequilibrium model, defining disequilibrium as the difference between the pay-off in
the socially optimal outcome and the individually optimal decision, summed over all
players. That is, they seek to minimize the aggregated opportunity costs for all market
participants from following the instructions of a social planner. The authors relate the
MD model both to the results obtained by a social planner and to the model proposed
by Gabriel et al. (2013).
One alternative recent method to tackle binary equilibrium problems focuses on
solving integral Nash-Cournot games (Todd, 2014) and provides an efficient algorithm
to obtain equilibria. This method works very well for a specific integer game with no
constraints, but the algorithm is not applicable to the broad class of binary-constrained
games considered in this paper.
2.2 Dual variables in binary programs
As mentioned above, dual variables in constrained convex optimization contain useful
information both for computational purposes and interpretation of the problem under
consideration. However, in mathematical programs with binary or discrete constraints,
the interpretation of dual variables as marginal relaxation is not valid because of the
non-convex and disjoint feasible region. This is related to the difficulty of determining
the value function of the original problem (Guzelsoy and Ralphs, 2007). To overcome
this caveat and obtain dual variables in such cases, the following approach is often
used (cf. O’Neill et al., 2005). Consider the general constrained problem:
min
x,y
f
(
x, y
)
s.t. g
(
x, y
) ≤ 0 , where x ∈ {0, 1}n, y ∈ Rm (1)
To obtain dual variables to the constraints g(x, y), this problem is commonly solved
in a two-step procedure: first, the original problem (1) is solved using integer program-
ming techniques; then, the binary variables x are linearized, i.e., the original problem
is replaced by the following:
min
x,y
f
(
x, y
)
s.t. g
(
x, y
) ≤ 0 , where x ∈ [0, 1]n ⊂ Rn+, y ∈ Rm (1linear)
Finally, constraints are added to fix these variables at the level determined to be
optimal, x∗, in the first step:
min
x,y
f
(
x, y
)
s.t. g
(
x, y
) ≤ 0 (λ) (2)
x = x∗ (µ) , where
(
x, y
) ∈ Rn+m
Solving the reformulated problem (2) allows to interpret the dual variables (λ, µ) in
the sense of multipliers or shadow values; offering these prices as contracts to market
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participants yields a Nash equilibrium. The dual variables µ are not part of the original
problem, they are obtained from the linearization and can be thought of as a “price
[. . . ] representing the integral activity for (each) agent” (O’Neill et al., 2005, p. 279).
These duals are also important for integer programs, so that most numerical solvers
automatically report these values when solving mixed-integer programs. However, one
must be careful when using this approach in practical applications, as these duals
cannot be readily interpreted as marginal relaxations of the original binary model –
that is, the marginal value λ of the linearized fixed program cannot be interpreted
as dual to the constraint of the original, mixed-integer program (problem 1). This
is, however, what many power markets are currently doing in practice: they use the
dual variable to the energy balance constraint as locational marginal price and clear
the market based on these pay-offs. The dual prices of the binary activities µ are
neglected. Instead, market operators assign compensation payments to make whole
individual generators after the fact.
2.3 Uplifts, compensation, and equilibria in power markets
There already exists a substantial breadth of Operations Research literature with re-
gard to electricity markets and pricing in non-convex problems, and binary games are
a prevalent concern in this area. The current practice in many centrally dispatched
power markets is that, first, the welfare-optimal dispatch is computed by the Indepen-
dent System Operator (ISO) and locational marginal prices (LMP) in the network are
determined using the two-step approach outlined above. Compensation to individual
players are then calculated after market-clearance to ensure that no market participant
incurs financial losses based on these prices. These are often called uplift, make-whole
payments or bid cost recovery, though actual implementations and rules differ across
markets.
System operators usually have non-confiscatory compensation rules (Sioshansi,
2014). This means that they do not assign penalties for deviation, but only disburse
positive compensation payments. In that respect, current market operation deviates
from contracts T proposed by O’Neill et al. (2005), which are derived from all du-
als (λ, µ). Instead, standard compensation payments are based on the pay-offs from
LMPs (the dual variable or vector λ only, in particular the duals to the nodal energy
balance constraint). It is important to note that these two are not equivalent.
This approach does not actually guarantee that the incentives of all players are
aligned in the resulting market outcome, because the nature of the non-cooperative
binary game between market participants is side-stepped. Generators that are not
dispatched by the ISO may have an incentive to enter the market, if they earned pos-
itive profits given observed market prices, or to deviate from the announced schedule.
Some markets allow self-scheduling, which gives generators the option to determine
their dispatch individually rather than surrendering their generation decision to the
ISO (cf. Sioshansi et al., 2010).
An alternative to the current approach is the minimum uplift or convex hull pricing
method, which relies on a convex approximation of the lower bound of the aggregate
cost function to derive prices and the minimal uplifts to support the market out-
come (Schiro et al., 2015; Gribik et al., 2007; Hogan and Ring, 2003). This method
acknowledges that compensation is required to deter generators from following prof-
itable deviations from the dispatch chosen by the ISO. Alas, using the convex hull
relaxes the integrality of the underlying problem, and therefore also does not solve for
the exact solution to the non-cooperative game between generators.
An important problem of the two-step approach arises from the fact that the budget
for necessary compensation payments is not considered when determining the dispatch,
but only computed ex-post. This neglects the potential trade-off between efficient
market operation and minimizing the budget required for compensation payments,
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which is usually funded from fees or levies on market participants. These fees may
in turn cause distortions in the market. It is easy to conceive of situations where
accepting a slight reduction in market efficiency (i.e., lower welfare, higher costs for
dispatch) allows to significantly reduce the compensation payments required. The
illustrative example in Section 4 shows just such a situation.
The method developed in this work tackles these caveats of current approaches and
proposes an exact solution method for games in binary variables. Our method offers an
important practical advantage: it allows to directly balance efficient market operation
based on an exact method for finding solutions to binary equilibrium problems, on the
one hand, with the amount of compensation payments to ensure that these outcomes
are stable against deviation by individual players, on the other.
2.4 Marginal relaxation vs. the loss from a binary deviation
There is a further caveat of using the duals of problem (2) for algorithms and (eco-
nomic) interpretation of results: this approach introduces the dual (vector) µ as the
marginal relaxation of the constraint that fixes x at its optimal value. However, it
is more appropriate to ask not about a marginal relaxation, but a switch from one
possible value of the binary variable to the other.
We introduce the “switch value” κ as the benefit or loss incurred by switching
from one solution to the binary problem f(x◦, y◦) to the optimal value of the objective
function given that the binary variable takes the other value, x× = 1 − x◦. Here, y◦
is chosen so as to minimize f(x◦, y), i.e., y◦ = arg miny f(x
◦, y), and y× is determined
equivalently.
Then, κ can be determined by computing:
κ = −f(x◦, y◦)+ f(x×, y×).
If κ is strictly positive, switching in the binary variable from x◦ to x× incurs a loss of
κ; hence, x◦ is the optimal decision. If κ = 0, the objective values are identical and
the player is indifferent between the two options.
When x ∈ {0, 1}n is a binary vector rather than a one-dimensional variable, the
switch value can be computed by comparing the objective value for a possible realiza-
tion x◦ to the outcome for all other permutations S({0, 1}n) of the binary vector and
choosing the most beneficial (minimal) alternative:
κ(x◦) = −f(x◦, y◦)+ min
x×∈S({0,1}n)\x◦
f
(
x×, y×
)
As before, if κ is strictly positive, this implies that x◦ is optimal, and κ = 0 means
that there is (at least) one alternative in the binary decision vector with the same
objective value.
This formulation still requires comparing the objective values of 2n alternatives
and solving for the optimal level of the continuous variables y in each case. Hence,
this approach may not seem like an improvement. The big advantage will become
apparent in settings where multiple players i ∈ I = {1, . . . , p} interact and one solves
for an equilibrium between them. A brute-force approach would require to solve all
permutation across players and their options in binary variables (2pn). Building on the
approach identified above, this can be transformed to a multi-objective optimization
problem with p 2n options. We will discuss the analytical properties in subsequent
sections and present a numerical analysis using a larger-scale dataset in the Appendix.
In the method proposed below, we use this notion of a switch value κ to choose
between equilibria in such games with binary decisions. This variable also serves as a
selection mechanism in such cases where no binary equilibrium exists; it can then be
used as a solution strategy to find an appropriate quasi-equilibrium. This approach
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holds promise with regard to algorithmic advances of binary and integer program-
ming, as well as allow a better representation of real-world problems in economics,
engineering, and beyond.
3 An exact solution for binary equilibrium problems
We now turn to our exact solution method to solve an equilibrium problem with binary
variables. The core idea for our approach is as follows: for each player, we derive the
first-order optimality conditions with respect to the continuous decision variables for
each state of the binary variable. In addition, we formulate an explicit incentive-
compatibility constraint to ensure that each player chooses the state of the binary
variable that is most beneficial to her.
For ease of notation and formulating a concise and simple exposition of our ap-
proach, we drop the index on the binary variable and describe the method in the case
where each player has exactly one binary decision variable, while the number of contin-
uous decision variables and constraints is arbitrary. Nevertheless, the approach works
for any problem with a finite number of binary decision variables. To illustrate this
feature, the electricity market example presented in the following section has multiple
binary decision variables per player.
The game is defined by a set of players i ∈ I = {1, . . . , p}, where each player seeks
to minimize an objective function fi(·). In the following formulation, each player
has a (vector of) continuous decision variable(s) yi ∈ Rm, binary decision variable
xi ∈ {0, 1} and a set of k constraints gi : Rm × {0, 1} → Rk with a vector of length k
of associated dual variables λi. As elaborated in the previous section, these dual
variables are only meaningful for a fixed xi. The feasible region of each player is
denoted by Ki =
{
(xi, yi) | gi(xi, yi) ≤ 0
}
.
Each player’s optimization problem reads as follows:
min
xi∈{0,1},yi∈Rm
fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
(3a)
s.t. gi
(
xi, yi
) ≤ 0 (λi) (3b)
The vector y−i = (yj)j∈I\{i} is the collection of all rivals’ decisions in continuous vari-
ables, and thus is of dimension m× (p− 1). The set of feasible strategies by the rivals
is K−i = ∏j∈I\{i} (yj(xj)). Because the continuous variables of the rivals’ depend on
their binary decisions, K−i is usually pairwise disjoint and non-convex. The formu-
lation implicitly assumes that each player’s pay-off is only affected by the continuous
decision variables of her rivals, but not directly affected by their binary variables. This
is a simplification only for notational convenience and can easily be relaxed.
A Nash equilibrium to this game is a set of strategies such that each player chooses
an optimal strategy given the action by the rivals. This is equivalent to the notion
that no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her decision upon observing the
decisions of the rivals; there exists no profitable deviation. This is formally defined
below; we distinguish between deviation incentives in the binary and the continuous
variables to facilitate the exposition.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium in a binary game). We define the binary game as
a set of players i ∈ I, each seeking to solve an optimization problem as given by
problem (3). A Nash equilibrium to this game is a vector
(
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈ Ki
)
i∈I such
that y∗i is the optimal decision (i.e., best response) by player i given x
∗
i and y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i),
fi
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
) ≤ fi((x∗i , yi, y∗−i(x∗−i)) ∀ yi ∈ {yi | gi(x∗i , yi) ≤ 0} ∀ i ∈ I (4)
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and such that there is no profitable deviation with regard to the binary variable,
fi
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
) ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y∗−i(x∗−i)) ∀ i ∈ I, (5)
where x×i is the alternative value of xi, i.e., x
×
i = 1− x∗i , and y×i is a best response of
player i under the assumption that xi = x
×
i , i.e.,
fi
(
(x×i , y
×
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
) ≤ fi((x×i , yi, y∗−i(x∗−i))
∀ yi ∈
{
yi | gi
(
x×i , yi
) ≤ 0} ∀ i ∈ I. (6)
Because existence or uniqueness of equilibria cannot be guaranteed in binary
games, we need to devise a method to select among several outcomes, or to arrive
at a desired point which is “almost” an equilibrium. For this purpose, we introduce a
market operator, as a coordination agent and equilibrium selection mechanism. This
entity is modeled as the upper-level player within a hierarchical, two-stage setup, where
the lower-level constraints represent the binary equilibrium problem. She guides the
players towards a desirable outcome and assigns compensation payments if necessary.
We formally introduce the term quasi-equilibrium for solutions to the binary game
that are not Nash equilibria according to Definition 1, but where incentive-compatibility
can be ensured with appropriate compensation payments.
Definition 2 (Quasi-equilibrium in a binary game with compensation).
We define the binary game with compensation as a set of players i ∈ I, each seeking
to solve an optimization problem as given by problem (3). A binary quasi-equilibrium
to this game is a vector
(
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈ Ki
)
i∈I and a compensation vector
(
ζi ∈ R+
)
i∈I
such that for each player:
1. y∗i is the optimal feasible decision (i.e., best response) by player i given x
∗
i
and y∗−i(x
∗
−i),
fi
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
) ≤ fi(x∗i , yi, y∗−i(x∗−i))
∀ yi ∈
{
yi | gi
(
x∗i , yi
) ≤ 0} ∀ i ∈ I, (7)
2. no player can improve her own pay-off by deviating from x∗i by more than the
compensation payment ζi; i.e., the compensation is at least as great as the benefit
from deviation with regard to the binary variable. Hence, there is no profitable
deviation with regard to the binary variable given the compensation payment,
fi
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
)− ζi ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y∗−i(x∗−i)) ∀ i ∈ I (8)
where x×i and y
×
i are defined as in Definition 1,
3. and the compensation payments are minimal, i.e., if a compensation payment is
required for a player, then the incentive-compatibility condition (8) holds with
equality. That is,
ζi = min
ζ˜i∈R+
ζ˜i
s.t. fi
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , y
∗
−i(x
∗
−i)
)− ζ˜i ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y∗−i(x∗−i)) ∀ i ∈ I. (9)
Note that when
∑
i∈I ζi = 0, the binary quasi-equilibrium is also a Nash equilib-
rium in a game without compensation. In the definition of the quasi-equilibrium, we
directly incorporate the notion that the compensation payments should be minimal.
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This is helpful because it eliminates those incentive-compatible solutions where the
market operator “over-compensates” some players, and it allows to focus on a smaller
set of candidate solutions. 2
3.1 Determining each player’s best response
In the definitions above, we have simply stated that the continuous decision vari-
ables y∗i are optimal for player i given the binary variable and the rivals’ decisions. In
order to efficiently compute this best response of each player, we use first-order op-
timality conditions with regard to the continuous decision variables. Hence, we need
to make sure these conditions are necessary and sufficient so that we can capture the
entire equilibrium set. An assumption on compactness is also needed for the selection
of certain parameters of our method.
A1 Assume that for each player i ∈ I, problem (3) is such that the first-order opti-
mality (KKT) conditions are necessary and sufficient with respect to the vari-
ables yi, and the feasible region defined by the constraints gi
(
xi, yi
)
is compact
and non-empty, for a fixed realization of xi and for any fixed feasible strategy
by the rivals y−i ∈ K−i .
As an example, the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for problem (3)
if fi(xi, ·, y−i) are convex and gi(xi, ·) affine for any fixed value xi ∈ {0, 1} and any
fixed vector y−i ∈ K−i.
Let the vector (x∗i , y
∗
i ) denote the best response for each player within the over-
all problem, given the decision vector
(
y−i(x−i)
)
i∈I by all rivals, and let y˜
(xi)
i de-
note the best response of player i for a fixed xi = xi ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the objective
value fi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i , y−i(x−i)
)
is the best pay-off that a player can do given xi and the
rivals’ strategies.
Under Assumption A1, if the value of xi is fixed at xi, the best response y˜
(xi)
i can
be found by solving the respective first-order optimality conditions:
0 = ∇yi fi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i , y−i(x−i)
)
+ λ˜
(xi)
i ∇yi gi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i
)
, y˜
(xi)
i (free) (10a)
0 ≥ gi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i
) ⊥ λ˜(xi)i ≥ 0 (10b)
Player i will choose the binary variable xi such that its objective value is minimal
given the decisions of the rivals y−i(x−i). Mathematically, the best response of player i
regarding her binary variable xi can be written as follows:
fi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i , y−i(x−i)
)
< fi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i , y−i(x−i)
) ⇒ x∗i = 1 (11a)
fi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i , y−i(x−i)
)
> fi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i , y−i(x−i)
) ⇒ x∗i = 0 (11b)
fi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i , y−i(x−i)
)
= fi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i , y−i(x−i)
) ⇒ x∗i = {0, 1} (11c)
The logic of conditions (11) is similar to the notion of incentive compatibility in game
theory, i.e., there exists no profitable deviation given the decisions of all rivals. Hence,
a vector
(
x∗i , y
∗
i (x
∗
i )
)
i∈I that satisfies the incentive-compatibility constraints in Defi-
nition 1 for each player constitutes a Nash equilibrium. If the incentive-compatibility
condition is not satisfied for any feasible strategy, it may be necessary to financially
compensate a player to ensure that she doesn’t deviate, as stated in Definition 2.
A direct implementation of the implicit “if-then”-logic requires additional binary
variables and thereby considerably increases numerical complexity. We overcome this
drawback by proposing a mathematically equivalent formulation using the original
2For games where the individual players’ optimization problems are non-convex with con-
tinuous variables, Pang and Scutari (2013) introduce the notion of a “quasi-Nash equilibrium”
to describe solutions that are stationary points derived from relaxed constraint qualifications.
In the definition used here, we are looking at a distinct concept of an equilibrium.
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binary variables of the players. The resulting overall program will be shown in prob-
lem (14); but first, we will discuss the reformulation and introduce the equilibrium
selection mechanism in more detail.
3.2 An efficient formulation of incentive compatibility
We introduce four non-negative variables
(
κ
(1)
i , κ
(0)
i , ζ
(1)
i , ζ
(0)
i
)
for each player, and a
sufficiently large scalar (or vector of scalars) K˜. The vector κ
(xi)
i is the switch value
introduced in Section 2.4; it can be interpreted as the loss the player would incur
by switching from her optimal value of the binary variable to the alternative. The
vector ζ
(xi)
i denotes compensation payments to guarantee incentive compatibility; in
cases where the market operator requires a player to act against her own objectives,
this payment ensures that the player does not have a profitable deviation.
The scalar K˜ must be large enough so that it does not inadvertently constrain
the variables
(
κ
(1)
i , κ
(0)
i , ζ
(1)
i , ζ
(0)
i
)
. Since these are differences in objective function
values, this implies that K˜ must be larger than the size of the range of fi(·). By
Assumption A1, each fi(·) is continuous over a compact feasible region, thus achieves
both its maximum and minimum within the feasible region. An efficient technique to
choose K˜ is to linearize the binary variables in the individual optimization problems
and minimize and maximize over fi(·) to find the largest difference possible. Note that
the role of K˜ here and in the subsequent sections is to enforce the disjunction between
two choices of the binary variable xi. It is the disjunctive constraints formulation
introduced by Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981).
The vectors κ
(xi)
i and ζ
(xi)
i are not dual variables in the original sense, but they
do contain similar information regarding the solution. Hence, they are analogous in
interpretation to a dual – but in terms of a binary deviation, not in the sense of
a marginal relaxation. Alas, the term “shadow price” often used in economics as
synonymous for dual variables could also be applied here.
We can now replace the incentive compatibility conditions (equations 11) by a
more efficient formulation:
fi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i , y−i
)
+ κ
(1)
i − ζ(1)i − κ(0)i + ζ(0)i = fi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i , y−i
)
(12a)
κ
(1)
i + ζ
(1)
i ≤ xi K˜ (12b)
κ
(0)
i + ζ
(0)
i ≤
(
1− xi
)
K˜ (12c)
κ
(1)
i , κ
(0)
i , ζ
(1)
i , ζ
(0)
i ∈ R+
The market operator selects a solution such that the first-order optimality condi-
tions and the incentive-compatibility constraints are satisfied for all players. In line
with the definition of the quasi-equilibrium as the minimal compensation payment for
each player i, the variables κ
(xi)
i and ζ
(xi)
i cannot both be strictly greater than zero at
a solution; this will be shown after we formally introduce the market operator.
Let us illustrate and discuss the interpretation of the variables κ
(xi)
i and ζ
(xi)
i in
more detail. The question is whether the solution for the overall equilibrium problem
chosen by the market operator is aligned with the best response of each player. By
this, we mean whether a player’s individually optimal decision coincides with the quasi-
equilibrium chosen by the market operator. There are five possible outcomes regarding
the incentive alignment of an individual player and the market operator; the cases are
illustrated in Table 1. In cases I and II, the incentives are aligned, as the player would
incur losses (a strictly worse pay-off) by deviating from the outcome decided by the
market operator. The respective switch value κ
(xi)
i is strictly positive. In cases III
and IV, the solution chosen by the market operator is not in line with the player’s
individual best response; only by disbursing compensation payments can the market
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operator convince the player not to deviate to the individually optimal decision. As
a consequence, the respective compensation payment ζ
(xi)
i is strictly positive, and a
quasi-equilibrium is realized. In the last case (no. V), the player is indifferent between
her options, so the market operator is not restricted in selecting either outcome. The
player does not have a positive switch value in either direction, and no compensation
is required.
3.3 Translating each player’s best response into the overall game
From equations (10), we have obtained two optimal decision vectors, y˜
(xi)
i , for each
player for both values that the variable xi can take. We now need to translate which
of these two decision variables is realized in the quasi-equilibrium and “seen” by the
rivals in their own optimization problem:
y˜
(0)
i − xi K˜ ≤ yi ≤ y˜(0)i + xi K˜ (13a)
y˜
(1)
i −
(
1− xi
)
K˜ ≤ yi ≤ y˜(1)i +
(
1− xi
)
K˜ (13b)
The logic of constraints (13) is straightforward: the decision vector yi, as it is con-
sidered by the rivals and the market operator in their optimization problems, must
be equal to the optimal decision y˜
(xi)
i for whichever value of xi is the solution in the
quasi-equilibrium, i.e., xi = 0 ⇒ yi = y˜(0)i and xi = 1 ⇒ yi = y˜(1)i . The parame-
ter K˜ must be chosen suitably large so as not to constrain the continuous decision
variable(s). This implies that K˜ must be larger than the size of the domain of yi. As
argued before, each yi is continuous and, by Assumption A1, over a compact feasible
region. A suitable value for K˜ can be found by linearizing the binary variables in
the individual optimization problems and minimize and maximize over yi to find the
largest difference possible.
We can now combine the incentive-compatibility constraints (12) with the equilib-
rium conditions (10) for the continuous decision variables into one set of constraints.
The non-linearity of the complementarity conditions (10) can be readily reformu-
lated applying disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981) or using SOS
type 1 variables (Siddiqui and Gabriel, 2013).
3.4 A multi-objective program subject to binary quasi-equilibria
So far, we have only replaced a number of equilibrium problems (for each possible
combination of binary variables) by a set of integer constraints that exactly represent
all binary quasi-equilibria. Next, we can apply multi-objective programming to direct
the game towards desired solutions. To this end, we introduce the market operator,
and we assume that she seeks to minimize an objective function consisting of two terms:
a function F (·), which only depends on the actual market outcome (efficiency of the
individually equilibrium xi chosen incentives
case optimal xi by market operator κ
(1)
i κ
(0)
i ζ
(1)
i ζ
(0)
i aligned
I 1 1 > 0 0 0 0 yes
II 0 0 0 > 0 0 0 yes
III 0 1 0 0 > 0 0 no
IV 1 0 0 0 0 > 0 no
V indifferent 1 / 0 0 0 0 0 yes
Table 1: Incentive alignment between a player’s individually optimal decision (her best
response) and the quasi-equilibrium chosen by the market operator
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solution; cost-minimization or welfare-maximization may be a natural choice for this
term) and a function G(·), which serves as a regularizer. Parameterizing this function
appropriately allows to weight between the different terms; in economic applications,
it can be interpreted as a penalty term that seeks to minimize the compensation
payments required to ensure incentive compatibility of the market solution.
The overall problem is a mathematical program subject to a binary equilibrium
problem, where xi = {0, 1} are the binary variables in the lower-level problem.
min
xi,yi,y˜
(xi)
i ,λ˜
(xi)
i
κ
(xi)
i ,ζ
(xi)
i
F
((
xi, yi
)
i∈I
)
+G
((
ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I
)
(14a)
s.t. ∇yi fi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i , y−i
)
+
(
λ˜
(1)
i
)T∇yi gi(1, y˜(1)i ) = 0 (14b)
0 ≤ −gi
(
1, y˜
(1)
i
)
⊥ λ˜(1)i ≥ 0 (14c)
∇yi fi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i , y−i
)
+
(
λ˜
(0)
i
)T∇yi gi(0, y˜(0)i ) = 0 (14d)
0 ≤ −gi
(
0, y˜
(0)
i
)
⊥ λ˜(0)i ≥ 0 (14e)
fi
(
1, y
(1)
i , y−i
)
+ κ
(1)
i − ζ(1)i − κ(0)i + ζ(0)i = fi
(
0, y
(0)
i , y−i
)
(14f)
κ
(1)
i + ζ
(1)
i ≤ xi K˜ (14g)
κ
(0)
i + ζ
(0)
i ≤
(
1− xi
)
K˜ (14h)
y˜
(0)
i − xi K˜ ≤ yi ≤ y˜(0)i + xi K˜ (14i)
y˜
(1)
i −
(
1− xi
)
K˜ ≤ yi ≤ y˜(1)i +
(
1− xi
)
K˜ (14j)
xi ∈ {0, 1},
(
yi, y˜
(xi)
i
) ∈ R3m, (λ(xi)i ,κ(xi)i , ζ(xi)i ) ∈ R2k+4+
It is important to note that the binary variable of each player has an additional role
in this formulation: it also controls which of the potential states with regard to the
continuous variables are active and “visible” to the rivals (constraints 14i and 14j).
Furthermore, it ensures that the correct switch values and compensation payments are
active (constraints 14g and 14h), in line with Table 1.
Theorem 1 (Exact solutions of the binary Nash game). Under Assumption A1,
any vector
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I is a solution to the binary game in Definition 1 if and only
if there exists a vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I , with ζ
(xi)
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, such that(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a feasible point to problem (14).
Proof. First, assume
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I with ζ
(xi)
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I is a feasible point
to problem (14). Then, by Assumption A1, we know that the point
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I is an optimal
solution for each player given fixed values of xi and y−i ∀ i ∈ I. This satisfies the first
part of Definition 1. Furthermore, we know that ζ
(xi)
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, and
(
κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I will
be selected according to the constraints of problem (14). By these constraints, we know
that fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
) ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y−i(x−i)) ∀ i ∈ I, where x×i is the alternative value
of xi (i.e., x
×
i = 1− xi) and y×i is a best response of player i, i.e.,
fi
(
x×i , y
×
i , y−i(x−i)
) ≤ fi(x×i , yi, y−i(x−i)) ∀ yi ∈ {yi | gi(x×i , yi) ≤ 0} ∀ i ∈ I.
This satisfies the second part of Definition 1 and thus we have shown that
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I is a
solution to the binary game defined by Definition 1.
Now, we assume that
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I is a solution to the binary game defined by Definition 1.
Choose K˜ large enough so that it is greater than the difference between any upper and lower
bounds on yi ∀ i ∈ I and greater than the difference between the minimum and maximum
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value of fi(·) ∀ i ∈ I. Such a value exists since by Assumption A1; the feasible set is compact
and fi(·) is continuous, so the maximum and minimum must exist. Then, by Definition 1, for
any fixed value of xi and y−i, yi is an optimal solution to the individual player’s optimiza-
tion problem. Thus, you can find (y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i ) such that
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i
)
i∈I satisfies the
constraints (14b–14e). Take ζ
(xi)
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, and choose κ(xi)i according to constraint (14f).
Thus, for any solution to the binary game in Definition 1 given by
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I , we have shown
that there there exists a vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I , with ζ
(xi)
i = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, such that(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a feasible point to problem (14).
The next theorem shows that the method can also be applied to obtain a quasi-
equilibrium. Note that we need an assumption on the objective function before we
can prove that our method can obtain a quasi-equilibrium.
A2 Assume that F
( · ) and G( · ) are convex quadratic or linear functions for every
fixed binary variable xi and that ∂ G
( · )/∂ ζi > 0 ∀ i ∈ I.
Theorem 2 (Exact solutions of the binary Nash game with compensation). Under
Assumptions A1 and A2, if there exists a vector
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I that
is an optimal solution to problem (14), then the vector
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I with compensation(
ζi
)
i∈I is a solution to the binary game as stated in Definition 2. Following the term
introduced in Definition 2, we refer to this as a binary quasi-equilibrium.
Furthermore, under Assumptions A1 and A2, if (xi, yi)i∈I is a solution to the
binary game with compensation
(
ζi
)
i∈I as stated in Definition 2, then there exists
a vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I , such that
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a
feasible point to problem (14).
Proof. First, assume
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is an optimal solution to problem (14).
Then, by A1, we know that the point
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I is an optimal solution for each player given
fixed values of xi and y−i. This satisfies the first part of Definition 2. Furthermore, we know
that κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i ∀ i ∈ I will be selected according to the constraints of problem (14). By these
constraints, we know that fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)− ζi ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y−i(x−i)) ∀ i ∈ I, where x×i
is the alternative value of xi (i.e., x
×
i = 1 − xi) and yi is a best response of player i with
fixed x×i , i.e.,
fi
(
x×i , y
×
i , y−i(x−i)
) ≤ fi(x×i , yi, y−i(x−i)) ∀ yi ∈ {yi | gi(x×i , yi) ≤ 0} ∀ i ∈ I.
This satisfies the second part of Definition 2.
By Assumption A2, we know that ∂ G
( · )/∂ ζi > 0 ∀ i ∈ I and, hence, for any optimal
solution, for each player,
(
ζi
)
i∈I is minimal. This satisfies the third part of Definition 2
and hence we have shown that if
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is an optimal solution to
problem (14), then
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I with compensation payments
(
ζi
)
i∈I is a solution to the binary
game defined by Definition 2.
Now, we assume that
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I with compensation payments
(
ζi
)
i∈I is a quasi-equilibrium
to the binary game with compensation defined by Definition 2. Choose K˜ large enough so
that it is greater than the difference between any upper and lower bounds on yi ∀ i ∈ I and
greater than the difference between the minimum and maximum value of fi ∀ i ∈ I. Such
a value exists since by Assumption A1, the feasible set is compact and fi is continuous, so
the maximum and minimum must exist. Then, by Definition 2, for any fixed value of xi
and y−i, yi is an optimal solution to the individual player’s optimization problem. Thus,
you can find (y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i ) such that
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i
)
i∈I satisfies the first two constraints
in problem (14). Calculate ζ
(xi)
i from ζi ∀ i ∈ I and choose κ(xi)i according to the third
constraint in problem (14). Thus, for any solution to the binary game in Definition 2 given
by
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I and compensation payment
(
ζi
)
i∈I , we have shown that there there exists a
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vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I , such that
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a feasible
point to problem (14).
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions A1 and A2, any vector (xi, yi)i∈I is a binary
quasi-equilibrium for the Nash game in binary variables with compensation
(
ζi
)
i∈I as
defined in Definition 2 if there exists a vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I , such that(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a feasible solution to problem (14) and ζ
(xi)
i is
minimal as defined in Definition 2.
Proof. By the arguments in Theorem 2, for any point
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I that
is feasible to problem (14), the vectors
(
xi, yi)i∈I and
(
ζi)i∈I satisfy the first two conditions
of Definition 2. If, in addition, Condition 3 of Definition 2 is satisfied, i.e., ζi is minimal for
each player i ∈ I, then (xi, yi)i∈I is a binary quasi-equilibrium with compensation (ζi)i∈I .
If a vector is a global minimum to the objective function (14a), this is the binary
quasi-equilibrium with the lowest objective function value F (·) +G(·). The following
lemma and theorem provide conditions for the existence of a binary quasi-equilibrium
that can be supported by appropriate compensation payments.
Lemma 1 (Existence of a Nash equilibrium in a game with fixed binary variables). If
for a fixed vector
(
xi
)
i∈I , the objective function fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
of every player i ∈ I
is continuous with regard to yi and y−i(x−i), and quasi-convex in yi, and the feasible
region defined by the constraints gi
(
xi, yi
)
is compact, convex and non-empty, then the
resulting continuous game has a solution.
Proof. The existence follows from Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem (Glicksberg, 1952).
Relaxations of these conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in contin-
uous decision variables are also discussed in the literature (Facchinei and Pang, 2003;
Nishimura and Friedman, 1981). The existence result for Nash equilibria in continuous
games given fixed binary variables in Lemma 1 can be combined with Theorem 3 to
provide reasonable conditions for the existence of binary quasi-equilibria.
Theorem 3 (Existence of a binary quasi-equilibrium). Under Assumption A1 and A2,
if for any fixed vector (xi)i∈I , the resulting continuous game has a solution, then a cor-
responding binary quasi-equilibrium exists for the Nash game in binary variables.
Proof. For any
(
yi
)
i∈I that is a Nash equilibrium given the fixed vector
(
xi
)
i∈I , we can find a
vector
(
y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i
)
i∈I such that
(
xi, yi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i
)
i∈I is a feasible point to constraints (14b–
14e). Recall that xi =
({xi, 1− xi})i∈I . Choose K˜ as in the proof for Theorem 2.
We can then find values the vector for
(
κ
(xi)
i , ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I such that
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i , λ˜
(xi)
i , κ
(xi)
i ,
ζ
(xi)
i
)
i∈I satisfy constraints (14f–14j), and where either κ
(xi)
i = 0 or ζ
(xi)
i = 0 for every
player i ∈ I. By equation (14f), this implies that ζ(xi)i is minimal. By Corollary 1,
(
xi, yi
)
i∈I
with compensation payments
(
ζi
)
i∈I is a binary quasi-equilibrium.
Theorem 3 implies that, if a Nash equilibrium solution to the continuous game ex-
ists for any fixed realization of the binary variables, then this solution can be supported
as a quasi-equilibrium with appropriate compensation payments.
The reformulated multi-objective problem subject to a binary quasi-equilibrium
(14) is a mixed-integer program. However, the incentive-compatibility constraint (con-
dition 14f) can still cause numerical difficulties, because the players’ objective functions
14
are often not linear and not even convex in terms of all variables, even when they are
linear from the point of view of the player itself. We will now introduce a special case,
which allows to reduce problem (14) to a linear or quadratic convex mixed-integer
program with linear constraints.
A3 Assume that each lower-level player’s objective function fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
can
be separated into two functions, where the first part is linear with respect to xi
and y−i, and the second part is linear only with respect to yi,
fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)
+ f
(y)
i
(
yi | y−i(x−i)
)
,
and the partial derivative of the objective function with regard to the continuous
variable yi, ∇yif (y)i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
)
, is linear in all variables.
Furthermore, assume that all constraints gi
(
xi, yi
)
are affine and can therefore
be written as:
gi
(
xi, yi
) ≤ 0⇒ aixi +Aiyi ≤ bi
where ai, bi are vectors and Ai a matrix of suitable dimensions.
This assumption implies that the functions f
(y)
i
(
yi | y−i(x−i)
)
need not be linear
with respect to all variables, only with regard to the player’s own continuous decision
variable yi.
One consequence of Assumption A3 is the caveat that the following theorems are
not directly applicable to Nash-Cournot equilibrium models, where a player is aware of
its own impact on the final demand price. These models are usually formulated such
that a player faces an objective function of the form maxy p(y) y, where p(y) is the
inverse demand curve; this violates the linearity requirement for the reformulation.
However, we only need Assumption A3 to prove Theorem 4 below, which allows
us to write the problem as a mixed-integer quadratic program, and obtain global opti-
mality results. Whenever Assumption A3 does not hold, as in general game-theoretic
settings, the reformulation introduced above as well as Theorems 1 and 2 are still appli-
cable, but we cannot mathematically prove global optimality of a numerical solution.
If we can show that problem (14) can be solved to optimality without Assumption A3,
our method will obtain globally optimal results to the binary equilibrium problem.
However, this will require novel research into general game-theoretic settings as well
as nonlinear, mixed-integer optimization problems, both of which we plan to address
in future work. We proceed with the theoretical results below to justify the general
setting of the power market uplift problem, which is the topic of this paper.
Theorem 4 (Exact reformulation as a mixed-integer linear/quadratic program with
linear constraints). Under Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, the multi-objective program
subject to a binary quasi-equilibrium (problem 14) can be reformulated as a quadratic
integer program with linear constraints. Theorems (1) and (2) remain valid.
Proof. By Assumptions A1, A2 and A3, the objective function is linear or convex quadratic,
and the first-order conditions and the players’ constraints are linear. The complementarity
conditions (14c) and (14e) can be reformulated using disjunctive constraints (Fortuny-Amat
and McCarl, 1981).
In the next steps, we will show how the incentive-compatibility constraint (14f) can be re-
formulated as a linear constraint. First, by assumptionA3, the function f
(y)
i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
)
is linear with respect to y
(xi)
i . We know that all linear functions can be written as the product
of their partial derivative and the variable with which the partial derivative was taken. More
specifically, this can be written as:
f
(y)
i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
)
=
(
∇yif (y)i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
))T
y
(xi)
i .
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By first-order optimality,
(
∇yif (y)i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
))
= −
((
λ
(xi)
i
)T∇yi gi(xi, y(xi)i )).
Then, applying the definition of gi(·) in Assumption A3, ∇yi gi
(
xi, y
(xi)
i
)
= Ai, and using
the complementarity condition of constraints (14c) and (14e), (aixi +Aiyi − bi)Tλi = 0, the
reformulation proceeds as follows:
fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)
+ f
(y)
i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
)
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)
+
(
∇yif (y)i
(
y
(xi)
i | y−i(x−i)
))T
y
(xi)
i
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)− ((λ(xi)i )T∇yi gi(xi, y(xi)i ))T y(xi)i
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)− ((λ(xi)i )TAi)T y(xi)i
= f
(x)
i
(
xi, y−i(x−i)
)− (λ(xi)i )T (bi − aixi)
Therefore, problem (14) can be reformulated as a linear/quadratic convex integer program
with linear constraints.
With this theorem, we show that our approach can be applied to a large number
of problem classes and still be solved as a mixed-integer linear program. These include
operational constraints such as capacity bounds or minimum generation requirements,
and market forms including linear inverse demand functions.
3.5 Comparing the binary equilibrium to a social-planner model
As a benchmark for comparing the binary-equilibrium method to commonly used ap-
proaches, we apply the following method: first, solve the welfare-maximizing problem
assuming a central planner, then derive prices from the linearized model using the
O’Neill et al. (2005) method, and finally compute compensation payments for each
player that has a profitable deviation, to ensure that every market participant is at
last indifferent and the outcome is stable in the Nash sense; i.e., no profitable de-
viation exists given rivals’ actions and market prices. This method is, in a way, a
lexicographic solution approach to the overall problem; mathematically, it can be seen
as a hierarchical min-min problem. For illustration, we formulate this problem along
the notation used in the derivation of the binary equilibrium method:
min
ζi
G
((
ζi
)
i∈I
)
+
 minxi,yi F
((
xi, yi
)
i∈I
)
s.t. gi
(
xi, yi
) ≤ 0 ∀ i ∈ I
 (15)
s.t.

fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)− ζi ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y−i(x−i))
∀ (x×i , y×i ) ∈ arg min
(xi ,y

i )
{
fi
(
xi , y

i , y−i(x−i)
) ∣∣ gi(xi , yi ) ≤ 0}

∀ i ∈ I
Throughout the following discussion, we will denote the optimal solution of the in-
ner welfare optimization of problem (15) as
(
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I , while
(
ζ◦i
)
i∈I is the minimal
compensation payment to guarantee incentive compatibility for all players. Similar
as in the definition of the binary game introduced earlier, the objective function of
player i evaluated at
(
x×i , y
×
i
)
is the best a player can do by deviating (cf. Definitions 1
and 2). In the context of this example, deviation is to be understood as not following
the decision of the benevolent social planner.
For comparison, we restate the multi-objective program subject to a binary quasi-
16
equilibrium (problem 14) in simplified form:
min
ζi
G
((
ζi
)
i∈I
)
+ F
((
xi, yi
)
i∈I
)
(14’)
s.t.

∇yi fi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i , y−i
)
+
(
λ˜
(xi)
i
)T∇yi gi(xi, y˜(xi)i ) = 0
0 ≤ −gi
(
xi, y˜
(xi)
i
)
⊥ λ˜(xi)i ≥ 0
fi
(
1, y
(1)
i , y−i
)
+ κ
(1)
i − ζ(1)i − κ(0)i + ζ(0)i = fi
(
0, y
(0)
i , y−i
)
“translation” constraints 14g–14j

∀ i ∈ I
In the following discussion, the optimal values of each player’s binary and contin-
uous decision variables in equilibrium and the compensation payments are denoted
by
(
x∗i , y
∗
i , ζ
∗
i
)
i∈I . The key difference between the above mathematical programs
is that problem (15) solves an optimization while problem (14) solves for a non-
cooperative equilibrium among all players. Thus, problem (15) is constrained by
general power market constraints while problem (14) has additional equilibrium con-
straints. Clearly, problem (14) is a restricted version of problem (15) whenever there
are no compensation payments or when the objective function does not include a
penalty term G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
.
The following two theorems formalize the idea that the social planner problem is
a less constrained version of the binary equilibrium problem. First, we show that if
the socially optimal outcome
(
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I does not require any compensation payments,
this solution (weakly) dominates the binary equilibrium outcome. Second, a similar
argument can be made if profitable deviations exist in the socially optimal outcome,
but the social planner does not assign a penalty for compensation in its objective
function, i.e., G(·) = 0. This is the case if such payments are assumed to incur no loss
to overall welfare.
Theorem 5. If any optimal solution obtained by the social planner (problem 15)
does not require compensation payments to any player i ∈ I, then the objective value
achieved by the social planner is at least as small as solution of the binary quasi-
equilibrium model, i.e.,∑
i
ζ◦i = 0 ⇒ fi
(
x◦i , y
◦
i , y
◦
−i(x
◦
−i)
) ≤ fi(x×i , y×i , y◦−i(x◦−i)) ∀ i ∈ I
⇒ F
((
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I
)
≤ F
((
x∗i , y
∗
i
)
i∈I
)
.
Proof. Assume
∑
i ζ
◦
i = 0 at any optimal point for problem (15). Whenever
∑
i ζ
◦
i = 0 in
problem (15), the feasible region of problem (14) is a subset of the feasible region for prob-
lem (15). Moreover, since G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
is an increasing function of (ζi)i∈I , whenever
∑
i ζ
◦
i = 0,
G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
is at its minimum. Thus, the optimal objective function value of problem (15)
forms a lower-bound to any optimal objective function value of problem (14). These two
facts combine to show that whenever
∑
i ζ
◦
i = 0 at any optimal point for problem (15),
F
(
(x◦i , y
◦
i )i∈I
) ≤ F ((x∗i , y∗i )i∈I).
The reasoning for Theorem 5 is quite straightforward: if compensation payments
are not required, the regularizer G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
does not add anything to the objec-
tive value of problem (15) and the incentive-compatibility constraints are not rele-
vant. Then, the binary-equilibrium model (problem 14) is a more constrained version
of the inner problem of the social-welfare maximizing planner: the objective func-
tion F
(
(xi, yi)i∈I
)
and the constraints gi
(
xi, yi
)
are present in both programs, but the
binary-equilibrium reformulation adds further constraints.
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Theorem 6. If compensation payments do not incur any cost to overall societal wel-
fare in problems (15) and (14), then the optimal objective value achieved by the social
planner is at least as small as the solution of the binary quasi-equilibrium model, i.e.,
G
((
ζi
)
i∈I
)
= 0 ⇒ F
((
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I
)
≤ F
((
x∗i , y
∗
i
)
i∈I
)
.
Proof. Assume that G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
= 0 in both problems (15) and (14). Then, for any
(
ζi
)
i∈I ,
the feasible region of problem (14) is a subset of the feasible region of problem (15). Thus,
for any optimal solution to problem (15), F
(
(x◦i , y
◦
i )i∈I
) ≤ F ((x∗i , y∗i )i∈I).
The reasoning is similar to Theorem 5: if compensation does not incur any penalty
or negative effects, then redistribution of the biggest possible surplus (or least possi-
ble cost) is indeed the preferred strategy. The additional constraints of the binary-
equilibrium method may restrict the solution space and could make the socially optimal
outcome infeasible in problem (14).
So far, we have shown cases where the social planner is superior to the binary-
equilibrium model. We now show that if compensation payments are to be used, there
is a case where the opposite is true.
A4 Assume that the objective function of the overall problem is the aggregate of
the pay-offs of each player, i.e.,
F
((
xi, yi
)
i∈I
)
=
∑
i fi
(
xi, yi, y−i(x−i)
)
.
This assumption means that the upper-level player acts as a social planner in the sense
that it optimizes the joint pay-off of all market participants. It also implies that no
player exerts market power (i.e., each firm is a price-taker). Another implication is
that consumer welfare can be included in the objective function, if demand is modeled
as an active player.
Theorem 7. Under Assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4, the optimal solution of the
multi-objective problem subject to a binary quasi-equilibrium (problem 14) is at least as
good as the solution to the social-welfare problem (15) subject to ex-post compensation
to guarantee incentive compatibility, i.e.,
F
((
x∗i , y
∗
i
)
i∈I
)
+G
((
ζ∗i
)
i∈I
)
≤ F
((
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I
)
+G
((
ζ◦i
)
i∈I
)
.
Proof. Let (x◦i , y
◦
i )i∈I denote the optimal solution to the social-welfare problem, and (ζ
◦
i )i∈I
is the vector of compensation payments necessary to align the incentives of all players. Follow-
ing Assumption A4, we know that the first-order optimality conditions of the social planner
in problem (15) are identical to the stacked first-order optimality conditions of each player,
whenever the binary variables are fixed at x◦i , i.e.,
∇yi Fi
(
x◦i , yi
)
+
(
λi
)T∇yi gi(x◦i , yi) = {∇yi fi(x◦i , yi)+ (λi)T∇yi gi(x◦i , yi)}
i∈I
Therefore, the vector (y◦i )i∈I is an equilibrium to the continuous game with binary variables
fixed at (x◦i )i∈I , and following Theorem 3, the vector (x
◦
i , y
◦
i )i∈I can be implemented as a
binary quasi-equilibrium. The outcome (x◦i , y
◦
i )i∈I with compensation vector (ζ
◦
i )i∈I and
corresponding dual variables thus feasible to problem (14).
The above theorem has an important implication for the numerical implementation
of the binary-equilibrium method: if Assumption A4 is satisfied, the solution to the
social-welfare optimization program (problem 15) can be used as a starting point for
solving the multi-objective binary-equilibrium problem. As the social-welfare prob-
lem is less computationally challenging, this should help in developing more efficient
solution methods for the binary equilibrium method.
Last, we state conditions when the solutions of the two approaches coincide.
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Corollary 2. Under Assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A4, whenever either
∑
i ζ
◦
i = 0
at optimality for problem (15) or G
(
(ζi)i∈I
)
= 0 for both problems (15) and (14)
the optimal objective function value of the multi-objective problem subject to a binary
quasi-equilibrium (problem 14) is equal to the optimal objective function value of the
social-welfare problem (15) subject to ex-post compensation to guarantee incentive com-
patibility, i.e.,
F
((
x∗i , y
∗
i
)
i∈I
)
+G
((
ζ∗i
)
i∈I
)
= F
((
x◦i , y
◦
i
)
i∈I
)
+G
((
ζ◦i
)
i∈I
)
.
Proof. The proof follows from combining the results of Theorems 5 and 6 with the results
from Theorem 7.
In conjunction with Theorems 5 and 6, Theorem 7 has an important implication:
if no compensation is necessary at the welfare-optimal solution and the assumptions
for the theorem are satisfied, the two solutions coincide. However, if compensation is
necessary to mitigate deviation incentives, then the multi-objective program subject
to a binary equilibrium can yield a better overall result. This is because the multi-
objective program can incorporate the trade-off between welfare and the compensation
payments necessary to guarantee a stable Nash equilibrium.
3.6 Computational complexity of the binary quasi-equilibrium
Last, let us compare the mathematical complexity of the social-welfare approach (prob-
lem 15) to our method in a linear problem setting, i.e., Assumption A3 holds and the
upper-level objective function is linear. Here, we focus on comparing the number of
binary variables in each approach. The number of constraints and continuous variables
also influence the computational complexity.
Alas, the exponential increase of complexity in the number of binary variables is a
more serious concern than additional constraints or continuous variables in a mixed-
integer program, hence our focus on this aspect in the following discussion.
The two-stage approach following O’Neill et al. (2005) requires first solving a linear
mixed-binary optimization problem with p n binary variables (where p is the number
of players and n is the number of binary decision variables of each player), and then
solving p optimization problems with n binary variables to determine the optimal
alternative for each player.
In contrast, the multi-objective program subject to a binary quasi-equilibrium
(problem 14) requires to solve a mixed-binary optimization problem with p (1+k) 2n bi-
nary variables, where k is the number of inequality constraints per player. The ap-
proach requires 2n binary variables to represent each permutation of binary decisions
per player.3 The term k 2n in the number of binary variables is due to the disjunc-
tive constraints reformulation to replace the complementarity conditions, which every
player has to consider for all permutations of her options in binary variables. This is
necessary to compute the optimal value of the continuous variables for each permuta-
tion.
This curse of dimensionality is similar to the numerical caveats of applying brute-
force enumeration strategies to solve binary games, which requires to solve 2pn contin-
uous problems. However, we illustrate in the numerical application presented in the
following section that the number of binary variables in our method can be significantly
reduced depending on the underlying problem.
3For an illustration of a more general application of the binary equilibrium method, we
refer to the natural gas market investment and production game available for download at
https://github.com/danielhuppmann/binary_equilibrium.
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In the power market uplift problem, the number of binary variables to obtain an
exact solution is only (n+k) p+l, where l is the number of binary variables required for
the ISO; this is, in principle, not a substantial increase in computational complexity
compared to the p n binary variables in the social-planner problem plus an additional
p optimization problems with n binary variables each to determine the compensation
payments required for incentive-compatibility to be satisfied for each generator. In
short, our approach scales well in the number of players, but not necessarily in the
number of binary variables of each player. We discuss further practical aspects on the
computational aspects of the problem in Section 4.4.
4 A binary game: The power market uplift problem
As an illustration of the methodology to solve binary games with compensation, we
present a stylized model of a nodal-pricing electricity market comprised of generators
with binary decision variables, demand units and a network. An upper-level player
assigns locational marginal prices to maximize short-run market efficiency (cf. Hobbs,
2001). Second, she disburses compensation payments to align the incentives of gener-
ators with the overall (societally most beneficial) outcome.
In contrast to the standard implementation of an Independent System Operator
(ISO), the market operator in our setting explicitly takes into account the incentives of
generators to deviate from the welfare-optimal dispatch schedule and assigns compen-
sation payments to ensure that the selected solution is incentive-compatible. This is in
contrast to the more common market setup, where generators only receive a ”no-loss”
compensation (guarantee of non-negative profits).
4.1 The power market model
The lower level of the market is composed of generators and a player representing
consumers (demand) and the network operator. Table 2 provides a summary of the
notation used in the example.
The generators
Each generator i ∈ I seeks to maximize profits from generating and selling electricity
over the time horizon t ∈ T . For consistency with the previous chapter, the generator’s
optimization problem is written in minimization form:
min
xti,yti,z
on
ti ,z
off
ti
− ptn(i)yti + cGi yti + c oni z onti + c offi z offti (16a)
s.t. xtig
min
i ≤ yti ≤ xtigmaxi
(
α onti , β
on
ti
)
(16b)
xti − x(t−1)i = z onti − z offti (16c)
xti ∈ {0, 1}, yti, z onti , z offti ∈ R+
The linear generation costs are given by cGi , the (binary) start-up costs are given
by c oni , and the (binary) shut-down costs are given by c
off
i . The operation schedule is
denoted by xti, the decision how much electricity to generate and sell to the grid is yti.
The ramping decisions in a particular period are denoted by z onti (start-up) and z
off
ti
(shut-down), respectively. The status of a power plant at the beginning of the model
horizon (i.e., x0i) is given by the parameter x
init
i .
The first set of constraints (16b) concerns the maximum generation capacity and
the minimum activity level (gmini , g
max
i ), if the power plant is operating (xti = 1). The
shadow variables (α onti , β
on
ti ) are only meaningful given a fixed operation schedule xti,
and we only compute them if the power plant is operational. If the power plant
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Sets & Mappings
n,m ∈ N ... nodes
t ∈ T ... time step, hours
i ∈ I ... generators, power plant units
j ∈ J ... load, demand units
l ∈ L ... power lines
i ∈ In, j ∈ Jn ... generator/load unit mapping to node n
n(i), n(j) ... node mapping to generator i/load unit j
φ ∈ Φ ... set of dispatch options (schedules) for each generator
t ∈ Tφ ... hours in which a generator is active in dispatch option φ
Primal variables
xti ... on/off decision for generator i in hour t
z onti , z
off
ti ... inter-temporal start-up/shut-down decision
yti ... actual generation by generator i in hour t
y onti ... generation if binary variable is fixed at xi
dtj ... demand by unit j in hour t
δtn ... voltage angle
Dual variables
α onti , β
on
ti ... dual to minimum activity/maximum generation capacity
νtj ... dual to maximum load constraint
µ+tl , µ
−
tl ... dual to voltage angle band constraints
ξ+tn, ξ
−
tn ... dual to thermal line capacity constraints
γt ... dual to slack bus constraints
Prices, switch value, and compensation variables
ptn ... locational marginal price
κ onti , κ
off
ti ... switch value (defined per time step)
ζi ... compensation payment (defined over entire time horizon)
Parameters
cGi ... linear generation costs
c oni , c
off
i ... start-up/shut-down costs
cDφ ... commitment costs in dispatch option φ (start-up, shut-down)
gmini ... minimum activity level if power plant is online
gmaxi ... maximum generation capacity
xiniti ... power plant status at start of model horizon (t = 0)
uDtj ... utility of demand unit j for using electricity
dmaxtj ... maximum load of unit j
fmaxl ... thermal capacity of power line l
Bnk, Hlk ... line/node susceptance/network transfer matrices
Table 2: Notation for the nodal power market problem
21
is not switched on, generation is equal to zero; however, due to costs incurred by
shutting down the plant (assuming it was operational in the previous period or at the
beginning of the model horizon), total profits may be negative even when the plant
is not generating electricity. The second constraint (16c) concerns the inter-temporal
consideration, i.e., the decision in which time periods the power plant is operational:
while the start-up and shut-down variables z onti and z
off
ti are binary in nature, they can
be relaxed to positive real numbers without loss of information. Integrality of these
variables is automatically enforced by the on/off variables xti.
The market clearing price ptn is the vector of locational marginal prices over time,
where n(i) denotes the node at which generator i is located; the set n,m ∈ N denotes
all nodes in the network. The prices arise as the duals of the market clearing condition
introduced below, and each generator takes the price at her node as given. Assuming
that the power plant i is operating in period t, the optimal amount of power gener-
ated y onti and the dual variables associated with the constraints can be determined by
solving the generator’s first-order optimality (KKT) conditions:
0 = cGi − ptn(i) + β onti − α onti , y onti (free) (17a)
0 ≤ −gminti + y onti ⊥ α onti ≥ 0 (17b)
0 ≤ gmaxti − y onti ⊥ β onti ≥ 0 (17c)
Otherwise, the amount generated is zero, and we do not require the dual variables
in that case. Hence, in contrast to the general formulation in Section 3, we can omit
the KKT conditions in this example for the case that the power plant is not operating
in period t.
Demand for electricity and network constraints
The other side of the market is a player seeking to maximize the welfare (utility) of
consumers while guaranteeing feasibility of the transmission system, given locational
marginal prices ptn. A set of units j ∈ J consume electricity (load dtj), each located
at a specific node n(j). The sets In and Jn are the generators and load units located
at node n, respectively. There are a set of power lines l ∈ L connecting the nodes;
the direct-current load flow (DCLF) characteristics are captured using the susceptance
matrix Bnm (node-to-node) and network transfer matrix Hnl (node-to-line mapping).
This approach is equivalent to a power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) matrix.
This player maximizes the utility of demand from using electricity dtj , where the
per-unit utility is given by uDtj . The first constraint is the upper bound on demand, as
a load unit cannot use more than dmaxtj units of electricity.
The next constraints (18c,18d) ensure that network flows are feasible and the
thermal capacity fmaxl of each power line is observed. Constraints (18e,18f) guarantee
that the voltage angle δtn is within the range [−pi, pi]. The B-H-formulation requires
to define one arbitrary node as slack bus nˆ, at which the voltage angle δtnˆ is zero by
assumption (constraint 18g). In line with the previous notation, we write the objective
function as a minimization problem. The term
∑
mBnmδtm is the net injection of
electricity into the grid at node n, which depends on the voltage angles δtm; multiplying
this term by the nodal price ptn and summing over all nodes yields the aggregate
congestion rents of the system. The market clearing condition (demand, generation,
and net injection) will be formally introduced later as a constraint of the upper-level
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player.
min
dtj ,δtn
∑
j∈J
ptn(j)
(
dtj +
∑
m∈N
Bnmδtm
)− uDtjdtj (18a)
s.t. dmaxtj − dtj ≥ 0 (νtj) (18b)
fmaxl −
∑
n∈N
Hlnδtn ≥ 0 (µ+tl) (18c)
fmaxl +
∑
n∈N
Hlnδtn ≥ 0 (µ−tl) (18d)
pi − δtn ≥ 0 (ξ+tn) (18e)
pi + δtn ≥ 0 (ξ−tn) (18f)
δtnˆ = 0 (γt) (18g)
Because the decision variables of demand and voltage angle are continuous, this
problem can be solved simultaneously with the generators’ problems using first-order
optimality conditions:
0 ≤ −uDtj + ptn(j) + νtj ⊥ dtj ≥ 0 (19a)
0 =
∑
m∈N
Bmnptm +
∑
l∈L
Hln
(
µ+tl − µ−tl
)
+ξ+tn − ξ−tn −
{
γt if n = nˆ
0 else
}
, δtn (free) (19b)
0 ≤ dmaxtj − dtj ⊥ νtj ≥ 0 (19c)
0 ≤ fmaxl −
∑
n∈N
Hlnδtn ⊥ µ+tl ≥ 0 (19d)
0 ≤ fmaxl +
∑
n∈N
Hlnδtn ⊥ µ−tl ≥ 0 (19e)
0 ≤ pi − δtn ⊥ ξ+tn ≥ 0 (19f)
0 ≤ pi + δtn ⊥ ξ−tn ≥ 0 (19g)
0 = δtnˆ , γt (free) (19h)
The upper-level market operator
As introduced in Section 3, an upper-level player acts as equilibrium coordination
mechanism: she sets a short-term locational marginal price ptn resulting from the
market-clearing condition (linking constraint across players) as well as compensation
payments to align the incentives of market participants and ensure that no player has
a profitable deviation. Mathematically, this player forms the upper level of a two-
stage, hierarchical game; the lower level is the binary quasi-equilibrium between the
generators and the demand/network player.
The upper-level player’s objective function is closely related to the generators and
the demand/network player, but not identical – the market operator does not only
consider short-term market efficiency (i.e., the sum of all players’ objective functions),
but includes the welfare loss from the disbursement of compensation payments ζi.
The objective function satisfies Assumptions A2 and A4, and the individual player’s
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problems satisfy Assumptions A1 and A3.
min
∑
t∈T
[∑
i∈I
cGi yti + c
on
i z
on
ti + c
off
i z
off
ti −
∑
j∈J
uDtjdtj
]
+
∑
i∈I
ζi (20a)
s.t.
∑
j∈Jn
dtj −
∑
i∈In
yti +
∑
m∈N
Bnmδtm = 0 (20b)
KKT conditions of demand and network feasibility (equations 19)
KKT conditions of the generators (equations 17)
binary equilibrium between generators (equations 21, specified below)
The first part of the objective function is the sum of the generators’ incurred
costs and the utility of load units from using electricity; this is equivalent to F (·)
in the theoretical formulation (problem 14). The second part is the regularizer G(·),
although it has a distinct interpretation in this example: because the compensation
payments to generators have to be funded through fees on market participants or from
general taxation, they usually involve some efficiency loss from market distortions.
The market operator sets a spot price ptn, which is considered by the generators
and the demand/network player in their respective optimization problem, such that
the nodal energy balance constraint 20b is satisfied.
Let us now turn to the equations necessary to guarantee the binary equilibrium
between the generators. If xti = 0 (i.e., the power plant of generator i is switched off
in period t), the first-order conditions can be omitted altogether; both the generation
level and the short-term profits in this case are zero, and the fixed costs from starting
up or shutting down will be included in the incentive-compatibility constraint. This
leaves the KKT conditions of the generators (equations 17) to determine the optimal,
short-term dispatch in the case that the generator is operating in this period (xti = 1).
The inter-temporal constraint of the power plant operation status has to be considered
(constraint 21a); the start-up and shut-down variables
(
z onti , z
off
ti
)
are determined by
the unit commitment variables xi.
Next, let us turn to the incentive-compatibility constraint: we now have multiple
time periods and we formulate the incentive-compatibility constraint in a different way
than in the general formulation in Section 3 (equation 14f). This is due to the problem
that it is not obvious how to allocate start-up costs over multiple time periods. It is
therefore preferable to define the compensation payments ζi ∈ R+ over the entire model
horizon and also write the incentive-compatibility constraint in this way, rather than
as a period-by-period constraint. As a consequence, we also change the interpretation
of
(
κ onti , κ
off
ti
) ∈ R: it now represents the short-term profits or losses (revenue less
generation costs), and it is not any more restricted to positive values, in contrast to
the switch value in the previous section and the overview in Table 1.
x(t−1)i + z
on
ti − z offti = xti (21a)
β onti g
max
ti − α onti gminti − κ onti + κ offti = 0 (21b)
|κ onti | ≤ xti K˜ (21c)
|κ offti | ≤ (1− xti) K˜ (21d)∑
t∈T
[
κ onti − c oni z onti − c offi z offti
]
+ ζi ≥
∑
t∈Tφ
[
β onti g
max
ti − α onti gminti
]
− cDφi
∀ φ ∈ Φ (21e)
The last constraint (equation 21e) is the incentive-compatibility condition: it ensures
that the profits for each generator (per period, short-term profits or losses from gener-
ating less the commitment costs) in the actual market outcome plus the compensation
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(left-hand side) are greater than the profits which that player could earn in any other
dispatch schedule φ (right-hand side). The revenues for each dispatch schedule can
be computed from the duals to the maximum generation and minimum activity con-
straints, summing over the periods in which the generator is operational according to
schedule φ; these periods are collected in the set Tφ ⊆ T . The total commitment costs
for each dispatch schedule are denoted by cDφi.
The final set of constraints of the binary quasi-equilibrium “translates” the optimal
generation decision for both states of the binary variable (y onti , 0) into the generation
level which is actually realized in equilibrium, yti.
0 ≤ yti ≤ xtigmaxti (21f)
y onti − (1− xti) gmaxti ≤ yti ≤ y onti + (1− xti) gmaxti (21g)
As stated in the previous section, the binary variables have an additional role in this
formulation relative to a standard unit-commitment model: rather than simply stating
whether a plant is operating or not, they control which of the two potential states with
regard to the continuous variables are active and realized in equilibrium (yti = y
on
ti
if xti = 1, yti = 0 otherwise). Furthermore, it ensures that the variables capturing the
short-term profit
(
κ onti , κ
off
ti
)
are correctly assigned.
4.2 Alternative rules for compensation payments
The incentive-compatibility constraint as stated above (equation 21e) is the direct
extension of constraint (12) in a multi-period setting. The short-term profits or losses
are succinctly captured by the vector
(
κ onti , κ
off
ti
) ∈ R, and the start-up and shut-
down costs are linear terms. As a consequence, this method is flexible and allows to
easily implement a wide range of market rules regarding compensation disbursements.
To illustrate the versatility of the approach and its applicability to different market
designs, we formulate two alternative versions of the model.
First, we implement a no-loss rule to replace the incentive-compatibility con-
straints: no generator may earn negative profits (i.e., lose money out of pocket):∑
t∈T
[
κ onti − c oni z onti − c offi z offti
]
+ ζi ≥ 0 (21e’)
In this setting, there is no constraint stating that the dispatch selected by the ISO
has to be incentive-compatible for each generator. Instead, every market participant is
forced to follow the schedule selected by the market operator. Hence, this setting omits
the game-theoretic considerations. Furthermore, the power plant is compensated even
if it would incur losses irrespective of the selected dispatch, so there may be over-
compensation. This can happen in our setting because there are shut-down costs and
some generators are operational at the beginning of the model horizon.
The second rule stipulates that only power plants can receive compensation pay-
ments if they were active at least once over the model horizon; this is to reflect the
potential concern that no generator should receive compensation for doing nothing.
ζi ≤
∑
t∈T
xti K˜ (21e”)
4.3 Illustrative results
The power system adapted from Gabriel et al. (2013) consists of 6 nodes, with 9 gen-
erators and 4 load units (see Figure 1). Each generator has a maximum generation
capacity of 100 MW and a minimum generation level, if operating, of 50 MW. Because
we assume that one time period t lasts for one hour, one unit of capacity (MW) cor-
responds to one unit of energy (MWh). Generators g3 to g6 are operational at the
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beginning of the model horizon and the power plants differ with regard to start-up,
shut-down, and marginal generation costs. Demand for electricity varies over time,
with a high utility for energy (or large willingness-to-pay, WTP) in the first hour and
lower WTP in the second hour. All data for generators and load units are provided
in Table 3. Regarding the multi-objective function representing the market opera-
tor, we assume that each monetary unit paid in compensation is a one-for-one loss of
welfare (sum of consumer utility, generator profits, and congestion rents). All lines
have a thermal capacity of 300 MW, except for the two inter-connector lines n2− n4
and n3 − n6, which have a reduced thermal capacity of 20 MW. Due to these bottle-
necks, the standard, welfare-optimal unit commitment model yields losses for some
generators.
We compare three different market rule cases; the game-theoretic considerations
and regulations (constraints) concerning losses and compensations are repeated here
for clarity:
Binary equilibrium: Every generator receives compensation such that she has no
profitable deviation. The constraint is repeated here for easier comparison with
the other market designs.∑
t∈T
[
κ onti − c oni z onti − c offi z offti
]
+ ζi ≥
∑
t∈Tφ
[
β onti g
max
ti −α onti gminti
]
− cDφi
∀ i ∈ I, φ ∈ Φ (cf. 21e)
No-loss rule: We solve the multi-objective program (problem 20a) subject to the
constraint that no player earns negative profits (instead of constraint 21e). Play-
ers may have profitable deviations, for which they are not compensated.∑
t∈T
[
κ onti − c oni z onti − c offi z offti
]
+ ζi ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I (cf. 21e’)
Incidentally, this case yields identical results as the standard approach, in which
the power market model is solved according to the two-stage procedure following
O’Neill et al. (2005), i.e., pay-offs are calculated based on prices from the dual to
the energy-balance constraint from the linearized problem, and non-confiscatory
make-whole payments are computed ex-post. However, the observation that the
two-stage procedure and the integrated multi-objective yield an identical result
is specific to this stylized example, and not a general property of the multi-
objective program under a no-loss rule.
n1 n2
n3
n4 n5
n6
g1 g2 g3 g4
g5 g6
g7
g8g9d1
d2 d3
d4
Figure 1: 6-node network, adapted from Gabriel et al. (2013), p. 18
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No-loss & active: We add a constraint to the previous case No-loss rule stating that
only active generators can receive compensation.
ζi ≤
∑
t∈T
xti K˜ ∀ i ∈ I (cf. 21e”)
The rationale for this rule may be to prevent gaming, or in response to the public
perception that there should not be payments for not providing a service.
Table 4 summarizes the rents earned by the generators in the three market rule
cases, as well as the required compensation. Table 5 shows the resulting nodal prices
as well as the amount generated and consumed by each unit. Generators g1 and g2
are not operational in any of these cases; therefore, they are omitted from the tables
wherever all entries are zero.
For reasons of illustration, we first discuss the results for the No-loss case; as stated
before, this yields the same outcome as the method proposed by O’Neill et al. (2005)
with ex-post compensation in this example. Generator g3 is switched off immediately
and therefore incurs shut-down costs of $ 300, while generator g4 is operating, but the
nodal price at node n2 is below her marginal costs. Both of these generators are made
whole such that they do not incur losses. The deviation incentives of each player are
shown in Table 6; here, one can see that generator g9 has a profitable deviation given
market prices in the no-loss case. As a consequence, this generator has an incentive
to switch on the power plant in spite of the schedule announced by the ISO, as she
would earn positive profits given the prevailing market prices. Hence, if self-scheduling
is an option for the generator, this outcome would not be a Nash equilibrium and the
solution would not be stable against deviations.
In the binary-equilibrium case, the market operator could choose to compensate
generator g9 to counteract self-scheduling, and then obtain the same dispatch and
nodal prices as in the no-loss case. This would require to compensate generator g9 to
the tune of $ 95 and generator g3 with $ 40. Generator g4 does not have a profitable de-
viation, because her losses are at least as great under all alternative dispatch schedules;
hence, she does not receive compensation. The objective value of the market operator
would be $ 2965 (total welfare of $ 3100 less $ 135 disbursed as compensation).
However, because of the integrated consideration of market efficiency and compen-
sation payments, the market operator realizes that it is preferable to dispatch gen-
erator g9 and instead shut down generator g4, realizing an objective value of $ 2975.
Generator g9 now incurs losses, because the resulting locational marginal prices given
cGi c
on
i c
off
i x
init
$/MWh $ $
g1 24 100 500 0
g2 22 140 350 0
g3 20 180 300 1
g4 18 220 250 1
g5 16 250 220 1
g6 14 300 180 1
g7 12 350 140 0
g8 10 500 100 0
g9 14 105 100 0
(a) Cost for generation and operation sta-
tus change, initial operational status
uD1j u
D
2j d
max
1j d
max
2j
$/MWh $/MWh MW MW
d1 25 20 100 50
d2 26 20 100 50
d3 26 21 100 50
d4 17 21 100 50
(b) Utility and maximum demand by load unit
and time period
Table 3: Data for generators and load
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No-loss rule Binary equilibrium No-loss & active
xiniti (xti) pii ζi (xti) pii ζi (xti) pii ζi
g3 1 (0, 0) −300 300 (0, 0) −300 15 (1, 1) −525 525
g4 1 (1, 1) −160 160 (0, 0) −250 65 (1, 0) −335 335
g5 1 (1, 1) 50 (1, 1) −50 (1, 1) −50 50
g6 1 (1, 1) 200 (1, 1) 100 (1, 1) 100
g7 0 (1, 1) 690 (1, 1) 715 (1, 1) 690
g8 0 (1, 1) 680 (1, 1) 730 (1, 1) 550
g9 0 (0, 0) (1, 1) −5 5 (0, 0)
Generator profit 1160 460 940 85 435 910
Consumer surplus 1380 1480 1830
Congestion rent 560 640 740
Total welfare 3100 460 3060 85 3005 910
Table 4: Profits by generator (pii) before compensation is disbursed, and rents by
stakeholder group for each case; on-off status and initial status by generator
the new dispatch are lower than her marginal costs; for these losses, she is compen-
sated by the market operator to prevent her from leaving the market. Overall, market
efficiency is slightly reduced, but the compensation required to maintain incentive
compatibility in this outcome is significantly lower than the payments necessary to
guarantee incentive compatibility of the welfare-optimal solution.
The last case, No-loss & active, illustrates how strict market rules can hamper effi-
cient market operation, even when they are intended to mitigate strategic behavior or
increase public acceptance of compensation payments. Generator g3 would incur losses
from shutting down at the beginning of the period, but cannot receive compensation if
she doesn’t generate at least in one period; therefore, the market operator dispatches
this plant throughout the model horizon. Because this would result in infeasible flows
on the network in the second period, the market operator shuts down generator g4
at the end of the first period. Now, this generator incurs losses from generating at a
nodal price below marginal costs in the first period and the shut-down costs, and is
compensated accordingly.
In this case, welfare is reduced by 3 % compared to the No-loss case, while the
required compensation payments are almost twice as high. Assuming that every dollar
disbursed in compensation payments is assumed to be a 100 % loss, the overall welfare
in the system is 30 % lower than in the best-possible outcome.
4.4 Numerical implementation and a note on computation
Reformulating the complementarity conditions of the demand-side player (equations 19)
and the generators (equations 17b and 17c) using disjunctive constraints yields a
mixed-integer linear program (Fortuny-Amat and McCarl, 1981). This approach to
determine a binary quasi-equilibrium requires 3 |T | |I| = 54 binary variables for the
generators and 2 |T | (|J | + |L| + |N | − 1) = 68 binary variables for the disjunctive-
constraints reformulation of the ISO. The total number of binary variables is there-
fore |T | (2 (|I|+ |J |+ |L|+ |N |−1)+ |I|) = 122. The large scalars K˜ for the disjunctive
constraints reformulation and the constraints on assigning the correct values κ onti , κ
off
ti
(equations 21c and 21d) were set to 1000.
This compares to |T | |I| = 18 binary variables to compute the welfare-optimal
dispatch and integer pricing following the approach proposed by O’Neill et al. (2005).
Our method is therefore more computationally expensive, but the number of binary
variables increases only linearly in the number of time periods, and sublinear in the
28
No-loss rule Binary equilibrium No-loss & active
t1 t2 t1 t2 t1 t2
Price n1 18 12.8 16.5 12.8 13.5 12.8
n2 18 11.6 17 11.6 11 11.6
n3 18 14 16 14 16 14
n4 26 20 26 20 28.5 20
n5 26 18.8 26 18 26 18.8
n6 26 17.6 27 17 23.5 17.6
Generation g3 25 25
g4 40 25 25
g5 50 25 40 25 37.5 25
g6 50 30 50 25 50 30
g7 50 50 50 50 50 50
g8 50 50 50 50 50 50
g9 50 40
Load d1 100 50 100 50 100 50
d2 10 30 65 40 30
d3 30 50 50 37.5 50
d4 100 50 75 50 100 50
Total dispatch 240 180 240 190 237.5 180
Table 5: Solution by market setup (prices in $/MWh, dispatch in MWh)
number of generators, load units, nodes and lines. Instead solving the resulting equi-
librium problem for every permutation of binary variables and checking for profitable
deviations ex-post (i.e., the brute-force approach) grows exponentially in complexity
and requires solving 2|T | |I| > 262, 000 (linear) problems.
The numerical model presented in this section is implemented in GAMS and solved
using the GUROBI solver. The code includes the possibility of multiple bidding blocks
for each generator and demand unit, as in the model formulated by Gabriel et al.
(2013), even though this option is not used here. The GAMS code is published under
a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License and is available for down-
load at https://github.com/danielhuppmann/binary_equilibrium. An algorithm
for enumerating all permutations and checking for deviation incentives ex-post was
also implemented to verify the accuracy of our methodology.
5 Conclusions and outlook
Non-cooperative games with binary decision variables are often encountered in real-
world applications, from engineering to economics. It is well known that equilibria
in such problems do not necessarily exist, and even if they do exist, finding them is
mathematically challenging. The most frequently studied example is the power market
uplift problem, which seeks to reconcile the difficulty of finding market-clearing prices
– based on the short-term, efficient dispatch – with obtaining incentive-compatible
outcomes in decentralized, non-cooperative markets. To date, no approach to exactly
solve such games exists.
In this work, we propose an exact solution method for binary equilibrium problems
based on computing optimal responses for each player for both values of the binary
variable (or vector), rather than assuming a continuous relaxation of binary variables
or relaxing the optimality conditions. We then add an explicit incentive-compatibility
constraint to ensure that no player has a profitable deviation. We define the notion
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of a binary quasi-equilibrium to describe situations where no equilibrium exists for
the original problem, but in which compensation payments can align the incentives of
players and a stable equilibrium is realized.
To this end, we introduce a market operator that acts as an equilibrium selection
mechanism according to an upper-level objective function. By recasting the binary
equilibrium problem as a hierarchical multi-objective program subject to a binary
quasi-equilibrium, our method allows to explicitly incorporate the trade-off between
market efficiency and the budget required for compensation payments to obtain an
incentive-compatible market outcome. With regard to the power market, this can
be interpreted as striking a balance between maximizing short-run welfare (consumer
utility less generation costs) and the amount of uplift payments, which are usually
funded through taxation, usage fees, or price mark-ups.
Instead of using the shadow price from a marginal relaxation of the integral con-
straint, our method yields a “switch value,” which is the loss a player would incur if she
were to deviate from her individually optimal decision. The switch value can also be
readily interpreted as the compensation payment a player should receive if the market
operator requires her to deviate from the individually optimal strategy. The switch
value can be used for algorithmic improvements and new approaches to solve binary
problems (e.g., act as a stopping criterion, guide a branch-and-bound algorithm).
Most importantly, we show that this method can be reformulated and solved as
a mixed-binary linear program under general conditions, and that the solution is at
least as good as the current practice under certain assumptions. Hence, the approach
can be applied to a wide range of real-world problems, including Nash equilibria in
energy and natural resource markets. The approach allows to include a variety of
market regulations, such as “no-loss” rules common in power markets. These rules
can be formulated as linear constraints and therefore do not substantially increase the
numerical complexity of obtaining a binary quasi-equilibrium.
The solution method for binary equilibrium problems proposed in this work can be
extended to include Generalized Nash games (cf. Harker, 1991) or games with individ-
ual joint constraints (Nabetani et al., 2011), as well as equilibrium problems in discrete
rather than binary variables. Furthermore, more general non-cooperative games can
be solved in this framework, such as games based on conjectural variations (Wogrin
et al., 2013). Extending the approach to stochastic applications is also straightforward.
One caveat of the proposed method is that the reformulation as a binary optimiza-
tion program with linear constraints is not directly applicable to market settings where
players are aware of their own impact on the final demand price (i.e., Nash-Cournot
equilibrium models). The properties of this method in larger-scale applications also
requires further investigation to better understand computation time scaling and nu-
merical characteristics.
The market rules obviously differ across various fields. A topic that has received
far less attention from the applied Operations Research community is agriculture.
Yet it is also a form of binary game between independent farmers (or agro-commercial
enterprises), which decide whether to plant a field or not. Interestingly, and in contrast
to power markets, there are subsidies being paid in many countries to farmers that
let some of their land lay idle. Hence, there is a payment for doing nothing! The key
difference may be that farming is seen as a market less prone to exertion of strategic
behavior, and that letting a field lay idle is still seen to provide a benefit beyond mere
price support, by maintaining the landscape or providing breeding grounds for wildlife
– public acceptance of support schemes may be higher in these cases.
In economic applications, the binary variables can be interpreted as on/off deci-
sions, or as market-entrance or investment decisions in a dynamic, two-stage setting.
Lumpy investment in the European power grid capacity by national regulators, each
seeking to shift rents towards their domestic constituents, is a natural next applica-
tion of the binary equilibrium method (cf. Huppmann and Egerer, 2015). The Euro-
31
pean regulatory agency ACER and the inter-TSO compensation mechanism under its
purview are very similar to the structure of the proposed method, where an upper-level
coordinator guides non-cooperative players with binary investment decisions.
Because most current power markets are based on a welfare-optimal dispatch with
ex-post compensation payments, there may exist numerous gaming opportunities for
large market participants in the current setting; the settlement in 2013 between the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and JP Morgan regarding manipu-
lative bidding strategies is a case in point4. It will be the subject of future research
to analyze whether our solution method for binary equilibrium problems will be more
or less prone to market power exertion and strategic behavior. Our method explic-
itly incorporates game-theoretic considerations (i.e., deviation incentives) rather than
simplistic no-loss rules, and it includes the trade-off between maximizing market effi-
ciency and minimizing compensation payments. As a consequence, our approach has
significant potential to improve the current practice in power market operation. In
particular, it allows to include the incentives of non-active players to enter the mar-
ket; hence, the behavior of non-dispatched generators entering the market through
self-commitment (or “self-scheduling”) can be more effectively addressed.
As a numerical application, we solve a stylized power market uplift problem. We
illustrate that the current practice in power market operation can lead to situations
where players have profitable deviations. In particular, when considering the nature
of the non-cooperative game in our stylized example, the market operator prefers
to deviate from the welfare-optimal dispatch, because a slight reduction in market
efficiency is traded for a strong decrease of compensation payments. To illustrate
the flexibility of our approach, we also solve the model under a hypothetical market
regulation stating that a) no generator may lose money, and b) only active generators
may receive compensation. This yields a welfare loss of 3 % relative to the optimal
solution. At the same time, compensation payments are almost twice as high as in the
currently used approach, so that compensation payments eat up almost a third of total
welfare in the market. We take this as a warning that market rules may have rather
counter-intuitive effects, even when they are implemented with the aim of preventing
strategic behavior or mitigating other inefficiencies.
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Appendix
GAMS codes, a numerical test case & additional examples
The GAMS code for the binary-equilibrium model presented in Chapter 4 is published under
a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License and is available for download
at https://github.com/danielhuppmann/binary_equilibrium. The repository also includes
an application of this method to a natural gas market investment and production game to
illustrate how the binary equilibrium approach can be applied to more general cases where
players interact in settings with multiple binary variables.
A numerical test case
To illustrate the numerical properties of the binary-equilibrium method, we apply the power
market model presented in Chapter 4 to the open-source model and data set provided by
Pandzic et al. at the Renewable Energy Analysis Lab (REAL), University of Washington,
Seattle, USA5). This open-source data and model were specifically adapted to provide an
easily scalable test case, using demand and wind timeseries over multiple days and apply
different settings to the dataset (differentiated by favourable or unfavourable wind situations,
wind penetration, power plant cost characteristics, grid congestion, etc.).
The test cases were run on a Dell Optiplex 9020 workstation (Windows 7, 8-core 64bit
Intel i7-4790 CPU@3.6GHz, 16GB RAM) using the GUROBI solver in GAMS 24.4.6, and
setting the GUROBI options to 3 threads on 6 cores.
For the present purpose, we use 7 consecutive days, each day represented by 12 two-
hour timesteps, 48 nodes (two out of three regions in the dataset), 64 power plants, and 79
lines (with transmission constraints). Then, we apply two different scenarios: first, a case
with favourable wind conditions, in which not much congestion occurs in the network. In
this case, the welfare-optimal solution (768 binary variables) was found within 0.5-2 seconds,
except for day6, where it took 92 seconds (optimality threshold 0.01%). Using the respective
starting point, GUROBI took between 102 and 150 seconds to determine that this was indeed
the optimal outcome, and that no welfare improvement (considering the trade-off between
maximum welfare and compensation payments) is possible (9,552 binary variables, at a 0.1%
optimality threshold). For details, see the parameter “report summary” in the results file
output/report MOPBQE region 1 2 wind fav.gdx.
As a second case, we set the switch in the original dataset to “unfavourable wind con-
ditions”. As before, computation times are up to ten seconds for the social-welfare problem
(WF-max), and between 102 and 150 seconds for the binary equilibrium problem (Bin Eq),
except for Day 3, where the solver encountered numerical problems and did not find a solution.
Over the entire week, congestion rents are much higher than in the “favourable wind
case”, and the binary equilibrium method identified reductions of compensation payments
of up to 35%, at no discernible loss of aggregate welfare (i.e. before compensation pay-
ments). In Table 7, we show both the compensation required to guarantee no losses as well
as the incentive-compatible compensation payments (“IC comp”), in line with the discus-
sion in Section 3.5 (Problem 15). The compensation payments are around 10% of generators
profits – they may seem small compared to the overall welfare, but this is because the con-
sumer surplus is computed as the difference between the actual price and the load-shedding
price bound. Congestion rents are much higher than in the case with favourable wind con-
ditions, and the binary equilibrium method identified reductions of compensation payments
of up to 35%, at no discernible loss of aggregate welfare. For further details, please refer to
output/report MOPBQE region 1 2 wind unfav.gdx in the GitHub repository.
Last, let us point out that there are almost 10,000 dispatch options for the 64 generators,
already accounting for eliminating all dispatch schedules that are not possible due to minimum
up- or downtime constraints (this is shown in the report “dispatch options” in the gdx report
file). If one were to try brute-force enumeration of all permutations of options to determine
stable Nash equilibria, this would require to solve 10128 equilibrium problems for these test
instances. In all cases, we also tried to solve the binary-equilibrium model directly without
using the starting point derived from the socially optimal outcome. In no case was a solution
found within the specified time limit of one hour.
5Available at http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/real/gams_code.html
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